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I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This litigation arises from a lawsuit regarding a mme collapse which

occurred at the Lucky Friday mine in North Idaho on April 15, 2011. Miners Pete
Marek and his brother, Mike Marek, were assigned to work in the 6150-15 stope of
the Lucky Friday mine on April 15, 2011. During the course of their shift that day,
the mine collapsed, killing Pete Marek and injuring Mike Marek.
The plaintiffs-appellants in this action, Patricia Marek, Michael Marek, Jodie
Marek, and Hayley Marek (collectively, "the Mareks"), subsequently filed suit
against the defendants-respondents in this action, Hecla Limited, Hecla Mining
Company, Silver Hunter Mining Company, Phillip S. Baker, Jr., John Jordan, Doug
Bayer, Scott Hogamier, Cindy Moore, and Dale Stepro (collectively, "Hecla"),
seeking damages related to Pete Marek's death and Mike Marek's injuries.

In

particular, the Mareks have asserted that it was Heda's reckless decision to remove
a pillar from the area that Mike and Pete were working in that caused the collapse.
The Mareks contend that decision, coupled with the unwarrantable failure by the
mine to evaluate the safety and advisability of the removal and the concomitant
unwarrantable failure to ensure the safety of the miners working in that area,
represent acts so egregious as to allow their suit to proceed and not be barred by the
general exclusivity of the workers' compensation scheme.
Hecla argued that the action by the Mareks against Hecla is barred by the
workers' compensation exclusivity provision found in Idaho Code §72-209(1):
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72-209. EXCLUSIVENESS OF LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER. (1)
Subject to the provisions of section 72-223, [Idaho Code] the liability of
the employer under this law shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liability of the employer to the employee, his spouse, dependents, heirs,
legal representatives or assigns.
The Mareks, on the other hand, contend that the rock fall at the mme
resulting from Heda's reckless conduct in removing the pillar and leaving
rock suspended and unsupported with no or inadequate engineering analysis
of the safety of that course of action, and failing to ensure the safety of
miners sent into a highly dangerous stope with virtually no safety measures
taken in light of the unjustifiable removal of the pillar

fell within the

exception to the exclusivity provision, as outlined in I.C. §72-209(3):
(3) The exemption from liability given an employer by this
section shall also extend to the employer's surety and to all officers,
agents, servants and employees of the employer or surety, provided
that such exemptions from liability shall not apply in any case where
the injury or death is proximately caused by the wilful or unprovoked
physical aggression of the employer, its officers, agents, servants or
employees, the loss of such exemption applying only to the aggressor
and shall not be imputable to the employer unless provoked or
authorized by the employer, or the employer was a party thereto.
(Emphasis added.)

Following summary judgment briefing and arguments, the

District Court granted summary judgment in favor Hecla on the question of
workers' compensation exclusivity, and denied the Mareks' own motion for
summary judgment seeking to strike Heda's affirmative defense asserting workers'
compensation exclusivity. The District Court also denied the Mareks' motion for
reconsideration of such determination.
This appeal followed.
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B.

Course of the Proceedings
This action was initially filed on April 12, 2013, in the District Court for the

County of Kootenai.

Hecla initially filed its Answer on November 8, 2013,

subsequently amending it on June 27, 2014 to add an additional affirmative
defense. Defendant Ron Krusemark was later dismissed by stipulation on March
11, 2015.
Cross-motions were filed by the Mareks and Hecla on February 10, 2015, and
February 23, 2015, respectively. Hearing upon the cross-motions was held on April
14, 2015, and the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment was entered on April 21, 2015. Judgment was subsequently
entered on May 5, 2015.
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 29, 2015, upon which a
hearing was held on August 18, 2015. The motion was denied from the bench, with
a related written Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration being later
filed on September 3, 2015.
The Mareks timely filed their Notice of Appeal on May 22, 2015.
C.

Concise Statement of the Facts
The Lucky Friday mine near Mullan, Idaho, is one of the nation's deepest

underground silver producing mines. (Record ("R.") 14 (,r21); R. 45 Cir21).) Plaintiff
Larry "Pete" Marek was an experienced miner with more than 26 years of
experience in the mining industry as of April 2011, who had worked for Hecla for
approximately 8 years prior to April 2011.
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(R. 14 (,rif23-24); R. 45 (i[,[23-24).)

Plaintiff Mike Marek, Pete's brother, is an experienced miner with more than 25
years of experience in the mining industry as of April 2011, who had worked for
Hecla for approximately 7 years prior to April 2011. (R. 14 (,r,r22, 25-26); R. 45
c,r,r22, 26-26).)

Mining at the Lucky Friday mme was done via the "underhand stope"l
method; after an area (the stope) was mined out, it would be filled in with a sand
and concrete mixture to serve as a competent ceiling below which the next mineralrich area underneath would then be mined. (R. 24 (Ruff Depo, 11. 24:12-24).)
In mining the previous two cuts above the cut at issue, pillars2 of waste rock
were left in place, with ore mined from both sides of the pillar. (R. 696 (Jordan
Depo, 11. 27:19-28:2).) In cut 3 of the 6150-15 stope, the pillars were extracted in the
mining process on both sides of the stope for a distance greater than had ever been
done before at the mine. (See, e.g., R. 717-718 (Lund Depo, 11. 13:18-14:13); R. 500
(Bayer Depo, 11. 26:24-28:4).)

The effect was to undermine the rock pillar for a

1 A "stope" is simply the term for a tunnel from which ore is mined at a particular level in a mine.
The technical designation of the stope at issue in this matter 6150-15-3 provides more specific
detail as to where exactly in the mine the collapse occurred: "6150" refers to the level/depth within
the mine that the stope is located (6,150 feet underground); "15" refers to the particular stope (versus
other numbered tunnels at the 6150 level); and "3" refers to the 'cut' in that particular stope, which
is the measure of the number of layers of the tunnel that have been mined out via blasting and
ore/waste removal (here, the tunnel was in the process of the third 'cut,' with two prior cuts above
having been removed and filled with a sand and concrete mixture). The stope is entered through a
"slot," an access tunnel from the main underground travel ways. Here, the slot runs south from the
travel way to the stope, where it intersects the stope in a T-shaped intersection. Each of the "arms"
of the stope are designated by compass direction from the slot - Pete Marek was working in "615015-3-West" at the time of the collapse at issue, and Mike Marek was working in "6150-15-3-East."

As some stopes are mined in the Lucky Friday, depending on where the particular veins of ore are
located and the concentration of minerals in the rock, a central pillar of rock may be left behind
essentially splitting a stope into two smaller tunnels, one on each side of the rock left in place. This
"pillar" may be used to prevent the tunnel from getting too wide, or to minimize dilution of the
extracted materials with rock that does not contain valuable ore. (See generally, R. 178 (Ruff Depo,
11. 87:11-24); see also, R. 527 .)
2
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distance of approximately 74 feet, leaving the roof of the stope

which contained

rock and sand/concrete fill from the previously-mined stope above

-

unsupported. (R. 408-409 (Ruff Depa Exh. 5); R. 497 (Bayer Depo, 11. 15:1-16:1); R.
718 (Lund Depo, 11. 15:10-13).)

On April 15, 2011, Pete and Mike Marek started their shift at the Lucky
Friday, to work in the 6150-15-3 stope. (R. 15 (,r,r29-31); R. 45-46 (,r,r29 & 31).)
Pete Marek went into the west stope, and Mike Marek went into the east stope, to
water down the muck pile, as their work area was otherwise muck-bound.3 (R. 15
c,rif 35-36); R. 46 cif 34).)

While Pete and Mike were working in the 6150-15 stope, the back4 in the
west stope, where Pete was working, collapsed. (R. 15-16 (iI38); R. 46 ,r38.) Tons of
rock, some in the form of large blocks representing an instantaneous failure, and in
what at least one miner described as the largest rock fall he'd ever seen, filled the
stope.

(R. 537-538 (Krusemark Depo, 11. 33:22-35:5); accord, R. 509-510 (Bayer

Depo, 11. 63:21-66:20).)
Search and rescue efforts were made to rescue Pete for the next 9 days; Pete's
body was found on April 24, 2011. (R. 16 c,r,r41-43); R. 47

(i[if 42-43).) The federal

Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA") thereafter conducted an

3 "Muck" is simply the term for broken rock after a blast. (R. 127 (Ruff Depo, 11. 36: 13-17 .) If an area
is "muck-bound," it means that there is no additional room at the time to move muck to a storage
area, and, therefore, the remaining muck cannot be moved out of the stope. (R. 593 (McGillis Depo,
11. 96:17-98:12).) The purpose of wetting muck in a stope is to keep dust down, explained by other
miners as a standard operating procedure to be done even when miners were muck-bound. (R. 618
(Houchin Depo, 11. 23:8-18); R. 593-594 (McGillis Depo, 11. 97:25-98:9); R. 636 & 647-649 (Stepro
Depo, 11. 35:4-37:12 & Depo. Exh. 15); R. 123-124 (Ruff Depo, 11. 32:25-33:3).)

4

In mining terminology, the "back" is the roof of the tunnel.
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investigation, and, on August 8, 2011, issued three citations related to the removal
of pillars in the 6150-15 stope. (R. 16-18 (,rif46-47, 50, & 53); R. 47-48 (,rif46-47, 50,
& 53).) Citation/Order Number 8559607 to Hecla provided:

A fatal accident occurred at this mine on April 15, 2011,
when a miner was struck by falling material while working
in the 6150-15-3 West stope. A substantial quantity of
material (measuring approximately 25 feet in width, 7 4 feet
in length, and 25 feet in height) fell 10 feet from the stope
back after portions of the supporting pillar were removed to
extract ore. Ground support was necessary in the stope to
mine safely, but the ground support utilized was not
adequate. The ground control was not designed, installed
and/or maintained in a manner that was capable of
supporting the ground in such a wide stope when the support
pillar was removed. Mine management has engaged in
aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary
negligence by directing the pillar to be mined as the stope
advanced and allowing miners to work under inadequate
support. This is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a
mandatory standard.
(R.

408-409

(Ruff Depo,

Exh.

5)(emphasis added).)

Additionally, MSHA

Citation/Order Number 8559607 cited "reckless disregard" by Hecla. (Id.) Another
of the citations, Citation/Order Number 8559608, stated as follows:
A fatal accident occurred at this mine on April 15, 2011,
when a miner was struck by falling material while working
in the 6150-15-3 West stope. A substantial quantity of
material (measuring approximately 25 feet in width, 7 4 feet
in length, and 25 feet in height) fell 10 feet from the stope
back after portions of a supporting pillar were removed to
extract ore. Management failed to adequately examine and
test the ground conditions to determine if additional
measures needed to be taken. This was necessary due to the
constantly changing ground conditions, they were mining a
wide stope and removing the support pillar. The operator
has engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than
ordinary negligence, as they needed to make examinations
and conduct tests to ensure that all feasible precautions were
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taken. This is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a
mandatory standard.
(R. 410-411 (Ruff Depo, Exh. 6)(emphasis added).) Again, MSHA Citation/Order
Number 8559608 cited "reckless disregard" by Hecla. (Id.) Finally, Citation/Order
Number 8559609 stated:
Portions of a supporting pillar were removed to extract ore in
the 6150-15-3 East stope. The section of removed pillar
measured approximately 18 to 20 feet wide and was mined
similar to the 6150-15-3 west stope that resulted in a fatal
accident when the pillar fell. Ground support was necessary
in the stope to mine safely, but the ground support utilized
was not adequate. The ground control was not designed,
installed and/or maintained in a manner that was capable of
supporting the ground in such a wide stope when the support
pillar was removed. Mine management has engaged in
aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary
negligence by directing the pillar to be mined as the stope
advanced and allowing miners to work under inadequately
supported ground. This is an unwarrantable failure to
comply with a mandatory standard.
(R. 412-413 (Ruff Depo, Exh. 7)(emphasis added).) Citation/Order Number 8559609

cited "high" negligence by Hecla. (Id.)

Heda's challenged to the citations were

heard in a multi-day administrative trial at which numerous witnesses testified.

(See generally Record Addendum ("R. Adden."), 8-26.)
On or about November 17, 2011, MSHA issued a "Report of Investigation" on
the "Fatal Fall of Roof Accident April 15, 2011 Lucky Friday Mine" ("The Report"),
which report was approved by Wyatt Andrews, District Manager for the Western
District ofMSHA on November 17, 2011.

(R. 18 (ifif57-58); R. 48 (i[i[57-58).) The

Report stated that:
The accident occurred because management did not have policies and
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procedures that provided for the safe mining of split stopes in a multivein deposit. Management failed to design, install, and maintain a
support system to control the ground in places where miners worked
and travelled.
Additionally management failed to ensure that
appropriate supervisors or other designated persons examined or
tested the ground conditions where the fall occurred.
(R. 426 (Moore Depo, Exh. 25)(emphasis added).) The Report further stated:

Root Cause: Management did not conduct an evaluation, engineering
analysis, or risk assessment to determine the structural integrity of
the stope back. The back that struck the victim was comprised of a
combination of paste fill and w_aste pillar. As shown on projection
maps, geologic structure in the form of joints, faults, and fractures
intersected the waste pillar at various angles. These intersecting
discontinuities cut the pillar rock mass into angular blocks and wedges
which facilitated gravity failure.
The large blocks and wedges
observed in the fall rubble were not sufficiently supported by the 6-foot
long rock bolts installed in the undercut surface of the waste pillar.
(R. 432 (emphasis added).) The Report also stated:

Root Cause: Management policies, procedures, and controls failed to
ensure appropriate supervisors or other designated persons examined
and tested ground conditions to determine if additional ground control
measures needed to be taken to ensure the safety of miners prior to
commencing work in the stope.
(R. 433 (emphasis added).)

On April 28, 2015 (after the District Court's initial summary judgment
decision), the Decision and Order in the MSHA Civil Penalty Proceedings against
Hecla was entered ("MSHA Order").

(R. Adden., 8-26.) Importantly, the MSHA

Order outlined the severity of Heda's actions/inaction, including:
•

"Hecla did not present any data, evidence, or test results to demonstrate that
the horizontal pressures were sufficient to support the ground under these
conditions. Hecla violated section 57.3360 because it did not design or install
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a support system adequate to control the ground m the cited area."

(R.

Adden. 17-18.)
•

"I find that the Secretary established that the violation was S&S [Significant
and Substantial].

A lengthy analysis is not required for this finding.

A

violation occurred that contributed to a discrete safety hazard, a measure of
danger to safety.

The Secretary established that there was a reasonable

likelihood that the hazard contributed to by the violation would result in an
event in which there is an injury. The discrete hazard was a fall of ground
and such a fall was reasonably likely because the pillar was inadequately
supported." (R. Adden. 18)(emphasis added).
•

"I find that the violation was the result of Heda's reckless disregard and
unwarrantable failure to comply with the safety standard. ... Although I do
not believe that Hecla intentionally risked the lives of miners, I find that
Hecla should have known that the roof support in 15 west beneath the waste
pillar would endanger miners and violate section 57 .3360 .... It should have
been obvious that a large, unsupported rock mass could endangered [sic]
miners, yet Hecla did not ascertain whether the waste pillar in 15 stope was
adequately supported." (R. Adden. 19.)

•

"The failure to analyze the risks posed by removing a pillar for a distance of
75 feet demonstrates aggravated conduct because it shows that Hecla made
no effort to properly design its ground support in this situation." (Id.)

•

"I reached this conclusion [increasing penalties for two orders from $20,900 to
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$50,000 each] because of the serious safety hazard created by these violations
and Hecla's high negligence. Management knew that (1) fractures and faults
were often present in the host rock; (2) miners were going to undercut the
pillars for a [sic] considerable distances; (3) undercutting pillars for
significant distances was not a typical practice in the Gold Hunter section of
the mine, and (4) no engineering study or any other study had been
undertaken to determine whether its ground support plan would adequately
support the roof under such conditions." (R. Adden. 24 (emphasis added).)
•

"I find that the Secretary establish [sic] that the civil penalty for Citation No.
8559607 should be assessed under the Mine Act's flagrant violation provision.
. . . In the present case, Hecla management had know ledge of the cited
conditions .... Hecla's management knew that miners were going to undercut
the pillar for a distance of about 75 feet during cut 3, knew that it was
unusual for miners to undercut a pillar for such a significant distance in the
Gold Hunter section of the mine, and knew that no engineering study or any
other study that had been undertaken to determine whether its existing
ground support standards would adequately support the roof or the pillar
under such conditions. Hecla also knew that the rock structure in the host
rock was subject to faults and fractures in the rock. ... I also conclude that
the violation substantially and proximately caused the death of Larry
Marek."

(R. Adden. 26)(assessing a civil penalty of $180,000.00)(em.phasis

added).)
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The Mareks identify the following issues on appeal:
1.

Whether the District Court erred in holding that Idaho's worker's

compensation exclusivity provision (LC. §72-209) barred the Mareks' claims against
Hecla and thereby granting summary judgment in favor of Hecla;
2.

Whether the District Court erred in holding that the Mareks - rather

than Hecla - bore the burden of disproving workers' compensation exclusivity on
summary judgment;
3.

Whether the District Court erred in holding that there were no

disputed issues of material fact so as to grant summary judgment in favor of Hecla;
4.

Whether the District Court erred in holding that Respondents Baker,

Jordan, Bayer, Hogamier, Moore, and Stepro were fellow servants immune from
suit under LC. §72-209; and,
5.

Whether the District Court erred in denying the Mareks' Motion for

Reconsideration of the District Court's summary judgment decision.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

III.

The Mareks only seek an award of costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40.

IV.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

While discussion of the facts and law underpinning this appeal requires some
discussion at length, the core question presented in this appeal is relatively
straightforward.
Idaho's

workers'
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compensation law

generally provides

that workers'

compensation 1s the exclusive remedy for workers injured at their places of
employment. However, that same law provides an exception to that exclusivity,
"where the injury or death is proximately caused by the wilful or unprovoked
physical aggression of the employer, its officers, agents, servants or employees[.]"
The application of this exception has been explored in the past, including in
Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 755, 760 P.2d 1171 (1988), and DeMoss v. City of
Coeur d'Alene, 118 Idaho 176, 795 P.2d 875 (1990). In both cases, application of the
exception was rejected, with this Court generally holding that the employers'
negligent conduct - in Kearney, missing lawnmower safety equipment, and in
DeMoss, a lack of asbestos safety measures during a boiler breakup - failed to rise
to the level that would warrant application of the exception.
However, Justice Huntley, in writing a concurrence in Kearney, went on to
outline the kind of conduct that would rise to a level so as to trigger the exception:
"I concur with the majority opinion with the caveat that there can be instances
where an employer's knowing ordering of an employee into an unsafe working
environment would, in my judgment, rise to the level of wilful physical aggression."
That precise kind of conduct subsequently arose in the case of Dominguez v.
Evergreen Resources, 142 Idaho 7, 121 P.3d 938 (2005), which involved an employee
who was directed to wash out a tank contaminated with a cyanide-laced sludge,
exposing the employee to a poisonous hydrogen cyanide gas, severely and
permanently injuring the employee.

While the employee was entitled to, and

received, workers' compensation benefits, this Court affirmed the employee's right
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to advance a lawsuit under the exception.
The facts presented by this case strongly echo the facts underlying
Dominguez - recklessly directing an employee to work in a highly dangerous and
unsafe environment - rather than the facts underlying, e.g., Kearney - employer
negligence in failing to attach lawnmower safety equipment. Here, Hecla removed
center pillars from a mining tunnel to a greater extent than had ever been done in
the mine previously, and did so without any engineering review and approval,
without a safety review, without additional safety steps being taken, and in the face
of warnings of a geologist and a senior miner of the hazards of doing so. In fact, the
risk taken in mining out the pillars was so egregious that, upon finally being shown
the map of the removals after the rockfall that killed Pete Marek and injured Mike
Marek, the mine's Chief Engineer said of the pillar removal, "You gotta be fucking
kidding me." The wholesale failure to employ any safety measures, yet continuing
to direct miners to work in such a space, ultimately and tragically resulted in the
death of Pete Marek and the injury of Mike Marek when the roof of the mining
tunnel suddenly and catastrophically collapsed.
Further, much like the employer in Dominguez, Hecla flaunted federal safety
regulations, resulting in multiple citations and, after full-blown litigation, an
adverse Civil Penalty Proceedings decision from the federal mine oversight agency,
l\1SHA. MSHA found, for example, that Heda's violation "was the result of Heda's
reckless disregard and unwarrantable failure to comply with the safety standard,"
and further held that "[i]t should have been obvious that a large, unsupported rock
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mass could endangered [sic] miners[.]"

In light of Heda's conduct, monetary

penalties were increased in the recent MSHA decision, to the total tune of $280,000.
The errors of the District Court, discussed herein, ultimately stem from the
District Court's failure to apply the exclusivity-exception as developed in the
J{:Qa.r;n~ concurrence and presented in the Dominguez case, instead analogizing this
matter to the Kearney lawnmower case. As a result, the Distr:i:ct Court failed to
appropriately consider evidence and law presented by the Mareks, which should
have resulted in a denial of Heda's motion for summary judgment and a granting of
the Mareks' own motion for summary judgment. This error was amplified by the
District Court's failure to reconsider the summary judgment decision following the
Mareks' motion for reconsideration, which outlined legal and factual errors, and
further provided the then-newly-issued MSHA decision.
Simply stated, the Kearney lawnmower case should not guide the decision in
this matter, involving a massive mine collapse that proved fatal to a miner; instead,
this case squarely echoes the kind of gross, reckless endangerment of employees
that should trigger the exclusivity-exception, as discussed in the Kearney
concurrence and presented in Dominguez.

V.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment.

"In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of
review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment." Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 46-47, 44 P.3d 1100,
1101-02 (2002)(citation omitted). "All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in
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favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party."

Id.

"Summary

judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law."

Id.

If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law

remains, over which this Court exercises free review." Id.

B.

Motions for reconsideration.
"[W]hen reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration

following the grant of summary judgment, this Court must determine whether the
evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment."
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). "We recently
clarified the standard this Court uses when reviewing a denial of a motion for
reconsideration[.] ... If the [underlying] decision turned on a question oflaw, we will
exercise free review." AED, Inc. v. KDC Invs, LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 163, 307 P.3d
176, 180 (2013).
VI.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court erred in holding that Idaho's worker's compensation exclusivity
provision (LC. §72-209) barred the Mareks' claims against Hecla and thereby
granting summary judgment in favor of Hecla.

1. The exclusivity-exception and interpretive Idaho case law.

a. LC. §72-209.
The exclusivity provision of Idaho's workers' compensation act, I.C. §72-209,

APPELLANTS' BRIEF 17

provides as follows:
72-209. EXCLUSIVENESS OF LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER. (1)
Subject to the provisions of section 72-223, [Idaho Code] the liability of
the employer under this law shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liability of the employer to the employee, his spouse, dependents, heirs,
legal representatives or assigns.

(3) The exemption from liability given an employer by this
section shall also extend to the employer's surety and to all officers,
agents, servants and employees of the employer or surety, provided
that such exemptions from liability shall not apply in any case
where the injury or death is proximately caused by the wilful
or unprovoked physical aggression of the employer, its officers,
agents, servants or employees, the loss of such exemption applying
only to the aggressor and shall not be imputable to the employer
unless provoked or authorized by the employer, or the employer was a
party thereto.
(Emphasis added.) As this matter falls into the exemption to exclusivity provided in
LC. §72-209(3), the Mareks' action is not barred, and the District Court's granting
of summary judgment to Hecla was in error.
b.

The Kearney and DeMoss decisions.

In ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the District
Court relied heavily on the Kearney and DeMoss decisions, holding that "Kearney
and DeMoss demonstrate that knowledge of the dangerous condition alone that
made it substantially certain that injury would occur does not create an exception to
exclusivity." (R. 984.) In Kearney, an injured employee attempted to assert a right
to the exclusivity-exception as the result of her employer's failure to attach certain
safety devices to a lawnmower. The Court rejected application of the exclusivityexception, generally holding that "there must be evidence of some offensive action or
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hostile attack" and that it is generally "not sufficient to prove that the alleged
aggressor committed negligent acts that made it substantially certain that injury
would occur." 114 Idaho at 757. In DeMoss, employees filed suit and attempted to
assert the exclusivity-exception as the result of exposure to asbestos during a boiler
removal. 118 Idaho at 177-178.

The District Court in this action erred in relying

upon these cases, as both are readily distinguishable from the instant action.
In both Kearney and DeMoss, the complained-of conduct paled in comparison
to the conduct in Dominguez (discussed below), and this action. Both cases involved
merely simple negligence, rather than the creation of a death trap. In Kearney, for
example, Justice Huntley, in his concurrence, bluntly noted: "In the instant case
there is no evidence to demonstrate that the employer knew the employee would
operate the machine without the grass catcher affixed, which installation would
have covered the opening in the chassis which exposed the blade." Kearney, 114
Idaho at 758. In DeMoss, the Court emphasized the initial lack of confirmation over
whether the substance at issue was asbestos, as well as noting that at least some
protective equipment was provided post-testing.

118 Idaho at 179 ("The record

shows further that John Austin, the city welder, told defendant Eastwood that he
thought the material might be asbestos. The record does not show that Eastwood or
any of the defendants actually knew that it was asbestos until the test results from
the laboratory were received. These test results were received after the appellants'
first exposure to the asbestos had occurred. Moreover, while the protective clothing
provided the workers prior to the second round of removal may indeed have been
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inadequate, that does not rise to the level of 'unprovoked physical aggression."').
Despite the refusal to apply the exclusivity-exception in Kearney and
DeMoss, the potential application of the exclusivity-exception that lay the
groundwork for Dominguez - and should apply in this action - can be found in
Kearney.

Concurring in the majority decision in Keamev not to apply the

exception, Justice Huntley illustrated where the exclusivity-exception would apply:
I concur with the majority opinion with the caveat that there can be
instances where an employer's knowing ordering of an
employee into an unsafe working environment would, in my
judgment, rise to the level of wilful physical aggression.
The issue is whether conduct which lacks a specific intent to injure can
properly be termed intentional under the terms of I.C. § 72-209(3). As
noted by the Court in Jones v. VIP Development, 472 N.E.2d 1046
(Ohio 1984),
[A]n intentional tort is an act committed with the intent to
injure another, or committed with the belief that such injury is
substantially certain to occur. See 1 Restatement of the Law
2d, Torts (1965) 15, Section SA. We hereby reject the
proposition that a specific intent to injure is necessary to a
finding of intentional misconduct. (Emphasis added.)
1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 15, Section SA reads:
The word "intent" is used throughout the Restatement of this
Subject to denote that the actor desires to ca use consequences
of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it.
Kearney, 114 Idaho at 758 (Huntley, J., concurring specially)(emphasis added).
C.

The Dominguez decision.

The premonition reflected in Justice Huntley's concurrence in Kearney
ultimately came to fruition in the later Dominguez case, where an employee injured
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in an industrial tank accident brought suit under the exclusivity-exception, despite
having already recovered under worker's compensation. In explaining the facts of
the matter, the Court highlighted the risk the employer created for the employee:
Evergreen owned an eleven by thirty-six-foot 25,000-gallon horizontal
steel tank (the steel tank). The steel tank had originally been used by
another company owned by Elias, and was used as part of a cyanide
leach process to recover silver from precipitator dust. After several
years of such use, a layer of cyanide-laced sludge formed at the bottom
of the steel tank. ...
In the summer of 1996, Elias directed Dominguez and another
employee to wash out the sludge that had accumulated in the steel
tank. Dominguez alleges Elias knew it was hazardous to enter the
steel tank, but concealed that knowledge from Dominguez. Contrary to
federal regulations, no confined space entry permit had been prepared,
there had been no special employee training, appropriate safety
equipment was not provided, and no attendant was standing by. The
two employees entered the steel tank through a manhole opening on
the top of the tank, and using a water hose and broom the pair
attempted to wash the sludge out through a small opening. While in
the steel tank, Dominguez was overcome by poisonous hydrogen
cyanide gas and lost consciousness. The other employee was able to
escape.
Although near death when he was extracted, Dominguez survived.
Having absorbed significant quantities of cyanide, Dominguez suffered
severe and irreversible brain damage.
Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 9-10.

The employee applied for and received workers'

compensation benefits, but then subsequently sued his employer under the
exclusivity-exception.

Id.

The employer defaulted (resulting in a $23,400,000

judgment) but then subsequently appealed, arguing that the claim could not be both
an "accident" for purposes of workers' compensation and an "intentional tort" for
purposes of meeting the exclusivity-exception. Id. at 10-11. The Court rejected the
employer's argument:
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Contrary to the Employer's assertions, injury in the course of
employment and injury as the result of an intentional act are not
mutually exclusive. As a matter of common sense, an employee can be
harmed while working, whether that harm is the result of negligence
or design. Even if an employer commits an intentional tort against an
employee, it does not follow that the tort necessarily arose outside of
the employment context, or that the employee was acting outside the
course of his employment at the time of injury.
An injury can be "accidental" from the perspective of an employee
while at the same time being intentional on the part of the employer.
The worker's compensation law defines an "injury" as "a personal
injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of any
employment covered by the worker's compensation law." LC. § 72102(17)(a). In turn, an "accident" is defined as "an unexpected,
undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, connected
with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be reasonably
located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an
injury." LC. § 72-102(17)(b). From Dominguez's perspective, the injury
that befell him was an accident under the statutory definition. In
cleaning out the sludge at the bottom of the steel tank, Dominguez did
not intend to be overcome by hydrogen cyanide gas. His injury was an
untoward event, connected to the industry in which it occurred, which
can be reasonably located as to time and place. It is no contradiction
for Dominguez's [sic] to maintain he suffered an accident covered by
worker's compensation and at the same time argue he was harmed by
the Employer's intentional acts.
In this case, Dominguez has alleged a willful or unprovoked physical
aggression by his employer, and therefore his claim falls into a
statutory exception to the exclusive remedy rule. LC. § 72-209(3).
Consequently, Dominguez is permitted to collect those worker's
compensation benefits for which he is eligible and to bring a cause of
action against his employer outside the worker's compensation system.
Id.; Kearney, 114 Idaho at 757, 760 P.2d at 1173.
Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 11-12.
The District Court in this action first erred in attempting to distinguish
Dominguez by ruling that "it is not alleged that Defendants directed Pete and Mike
into a dangerous environment, it has not been alleged that Defendants knew that
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the environment was hazardous, and it has not been alleged that Defendants
hampered or impeded rescue efforts." (R. 980.)

While the Complaint and facts set

forth by the Mareks squarely rebut this holding (see generally, e.g., R. 19-21

(ifif 62-

71) & R. 72-79), 5 this reading of Dominguez is errantly predicated on the
assumption that the employer in Domjn!Yuez (and in Kearney and DeMoss) actively
and intentionally sought to injure the harmed employees. The District Court later
repeats this error in holding that "Plaintiffs have failed to put forth any evidence
that Defendants harbored any ill will toward Mike and/or Pete, nor have Plaintiffs
put forth any evidence the Defendants wanted to cause injury or death to
Plaintiffs." (R. 984.) However, as explained in the In re Elias decision (a District of
Idaho bankruptcy decision related to the events of Dominguez), it is not merely a
question of a subjective intent to harm a particular employee or a belief that harm
was substantially certain to occur, but acting with a harmful state of mind such as
to willfully disregard the potential for harm:
Regarding the "willful" element, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's
state court complaint establishes that Defendant acted with
the requisite subjective intent in sending Defendant into the
toxic environment of the tank car ....
Effectively, to recover outside the Worker's Compensation system, a
claimant must prove that the employer committed an intentional act of
aggression against the claimant which caused an injury. And as
mentioned above, to recover an award of punitive damages, the state
The Mareks did not contend that there was any effort by Hecla to hamper or impede rescue efforts.
However, this observation by the District Court, in contrasting Dominguez, offers nothing, as the
injuries suffered by the Mareks resulted from the rockfall itself, and were not caused by or
exacerbated by the rescue efforts, unlike Dominguez. See 142 Idaho at 10 ("When firefighters
arrived on the scene they cut through the steel tank in order to pull Dominguez out. Elias was
allegedly uncooperative with rescue and medical workers, refusing to accurately identify the
material in the steel tank and thereby hampering Dominguez's rescue and treatment.")
5
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court must conclude that the defendant possessed an extremely
harmful state of mind and have acted with an understanding of, or
disregard for, the likely consequences of his or her acts. Cheney, 665
P.2d at 669.
In this case the default judgment against Defendant can be fairly read
as establishing that when Defendant sent Plaintiff into the tank car,
he acted with a harmful state of mind and that in doing so,
Defendant either understood, or knowingly disregarded, the
likely consequences of Plaintiff's entry into a confined space
containing harmful chemicals, with little or no ventilation and
no safety equipment. Stated differently, the state court judgment,
although employing somewhat different language, preclusively
establishes that the allegations of the complaint are true, and that
Defendant acted with a subjective intent to harm Plaintiff, or that he
believed that harm was substantially certain to occur. Any semantic
differences
notwithstanding,
considering the
Idaho
courts'
interpretation of the phrase "wilful act of physical aggression,"
together with its rulings concerning the mental state necessary to
support an award of punitive damages, the state court's default
judgment conclusively establishes that Defendant, while
harboring an extremely harmful state of mind, committed an
act of wilful physical aggression against Plaintiff.
In re Elias, 302 B.R. 900, 912-13 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003) (emphases added). More
bluntly stated, an employer cannot create a deathtrap and escape liability by
claiming that it did not intend to specifically harm that particular employee in a
specific fashion. Nothing in any of the Dominguez cases suggest that Elias was "out
to get" Scott Dominguez, or to deliberately trap him in a cloud of cyanide gas rather, Elias disregarded the plain risk posed to any employee, including the other
employees endangered by his nonchalant treatment of a tank full of cyanide sludge,
as summarized by the Ninth Circuit:
At AEI, Elias had used the thirty-six-foot-long, eleven-foot-high tank
as a storage tank for byproducts of a cyanide leaching process he had
patented. Elias realized that his process resulted in the transfer of
cyanide-laced solids into the tank. He admitted, moreover, that there
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were one to two tons of cyanide-laced sludge left in the tank when he
shipped it to Evergreen in the early 1990s. This sludge did not
preclude Elias from using the tank for some purposes. In 1996,
however, Elias decided that the sludge, which was hardened and more
than a foot deep, had to be cleaned out of the tank before he could store
the sulfuric acid in it.
On August 26, 1996, Elias ordered four of his employees, Bryan Smith,
Gene Thornock, Darrin Weaver, and Scott Dominguez, to enter the
tank and wash the sludge out a valve opening in the end. Despite
Smith's repeated requests, Elias failed to provide any safety equipment
for this task. Consequently, Dominguez and Weaver entered the tank
wearing only their regular work clothes. After about fifteen minutes,
they realized that the sludge could not be washed out the small hole in
the end of the tank, and they exited. Both complained of sore throats
and nasal passages.
The next morning, on August 27, 1996, Elias met with his employees,
who told him of the difficulties of the day before and the health effects
they suffered. Smith again insisted on the necessary safety equipment.
Elias said he would get it, but told his employees to proceed anyway
and that he expected the tank to be cleaned out that morning.
Although he instructed his employees to "do it by the book," Elias
provided none of the safety equipment or training needed for them to
do so.
After cutting a bigger hole in the end of the tank, Dominguez and
Weaver again entered the tank with no safety equipment. About 45
minutes later, after they had emptied about one-third of the sludge
through the hole onto the ground, Weaver shouted that Dominguez
had collapsed. Thornock and Smith unsuccessfully tried to get
Dominguez out of the tank, which had only a 22-inch manhole at the
top. When firefighters got to Dominguez, he was in severe respiratory
distress and in danger of dying.
United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir.), as modified (Dec. 21, 2001),
supplemented, 27 F. App'x 750 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, the In Re Elias decision's key

recognition

that "[d]efendant either understood, or knowingly disregarded, the

likely consequences of Plaintiffs entry into a confined space containing harmful
chemicals, with little or no ventilation and no safety equipment"
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squarely frames

the kind of conduct required to trigger the exclusivity-exception.

Accord

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 1 (2010)("A person acts with
the intent to produce a consequence if: (a) the person acts with the purpose of
producing that consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the consequence is
substantially certain to result .... Comment E: In those occupational-injury cases in
which courts have applied the substantial-certainty test, there generally is a
localized job-site hazard, which threatens harm to a small number of identifiable
employees during a relatively limited period of time.").
The

District

Court further

erred by holding that Dominguez was

distinguishable, procedurally, merely because it arose from a default.

(R. 980.)

While the Dominguez judgment was the result of a default, the deemed-true
allegations must still be sufficient to state a legal claim that supports a judgment.
Olson v. Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 37, 720 P.2d 217, 220 (Ct. App. l986)(cited in
Dominguez)("On appeal, a defaulted defendant may not challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence in a default judgment, he may only contest the sufficiency of the
complaint and its allegations to support the judgment."); see also Holladay v.
Lindsay, 143 Idaho 767, 772, 152 P.3d 638, 643 (Ct. App. 2006)("0n default, 'all well
pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are deemed admitted,' and therefore, if
the complaint sufficiently alleges facts upon which the plaintiff would be entitled to
damages, the plaintiff may recover those damages without proving any additional
facts.")(internal citation omitted); Johnson v. State, 112 Idaho 1112, 1114-1115, 739
P.3d 411, 413-414 (Ct. App. 1987)("[T]he court may consider the merits of the
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underlying cause of action in determining whether entry of default is appropriate.");

accord, generally, lOA Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2688 (3d
ed.)("Even after default, however, it remains for the court to consider whether the
unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default
does not admit mere conclusions of law.").
2.

The Exclusivity-Exception applies in this matter. and the Mareks
should have been granted summary judgment on this issue.

In light of the framework set out in the Kearney concurrence and its
subsequent application in Dominguez, the facts of this case make clear that the
Mareks are entitled to application of the exclusivity-exception.
The mining projections at issue, calling for the extensive undermining of the
pillar that led to this tragedy, was made by Lead Production Geologist Bruce Cox.
(R. 451-452 & 482-487 (Cox Depo, 11. 40:24-42:6 & Exh. 57).) In his interview with
MSHA, Mr. Cox explained why the cuts were to be taken:
Q. Why were the Mo pillars in 15 and 12 undercut?
A. to gain more of Lhe better grade _material of ore, in 15-3, to drop the ,n vein off and
mine the 30 and. 40 veins together, ... tal:e that ore and drop th¢ waste off th(! North side V
Q. it W<lS WilSte, in the VCrticru sense?
'J11c::. pil lcp, it'(<:<;, '<1 c~::, f- <- .(.o, ~ -t=. 6 "''"-1$
A, yes
<111..{ •10,v vJ'c +ct!::.c i+ <'(_-:;
c..-c.

fil--

(R. 484.) Mr. Cox also explained the general process for review and approval of a

mining plan:

6 The mining plans implemented begin as a "mining projection" created by the Geology department,
outlining where and how the mining is to take place, and take into account the mining done in the
immediately preceding cut above.
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Q. how does your job as a geologist rrffe-ct the decisions co t1.kc pillars?

A. my 'Nork unrlPr&ronnd doesn't anticipate u.ridercutling pillars. my work anticipates
mining the best v.nluc material, and \Ve make those reconunendations to opcrntions ...
Q. rou identify the ore, and someone else determines how lo mine it?
A. yes.
Roet~rs: Q. who muke.s that decision, the final decision?
A. I don't knov1, it's not geology,
Rogers: Q. so it's either en~-ineering, or operations? \'\'ho is operations? who sits in?
A. typical meeting is Thursday morning, development meeting, we have mine GF,

mine superi1:tenden:, SOJR.~JJ~R?~tk~~ing, someone fr~m geolo1:?, someone
from safety, same thing Wedrn:!~ays, what \Ve cail the supervisors meeting, plans to

mine stopes are discussed then
Rogers: Q. typical group?

5J:t.c,.-

(Id.) Mine Superintendent Doug Bayer testified that he reviewed and approved the

mining plan at issue.

(R. 495 (Bayer Depo, 11. 9:8-9:16).)

Chief Geologist Terry

DeVoe explained that the decision to remove the pillar at issue was an economic
one:
21
MR. HAVAS: Q Stated more simply, the decision to
22 mine through the pillar, to take the pillar and
23 undermine it above, was an economic decision.
24
A One of the components of that decision was
25 economic, yes. But not the only -- I mean -- it's a
1 long-term plan.
2
Q Your answer was "Based on economics?"
3
"Yes."
That was your answer then. And you stand by
4
5 your statement; correct?
6
A Yes.
(R. 575-576 & 686 (De Voe Depo, 11. 97:21-98:6 & Depo. Exh. 64).) Numerous willful
deficiencies in the process of approving the pillar removal, and having the Mareks
work in the dangerous stope, are readily identifiable:
•

No engineer review and approval was secured. Heda's Chief Engineer,

Ron Krusemark, did not see the pillar removal plans until the date of, and after, the
collapse. (R. 532 (Krusemark Depo, 11. 12:5-12); accord, R. 452 & 489 (Cox Depo, 11.
42:15-43:13 & Exh. 58).) At deposition, Mr. Krusemark testified as to his shock on
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reviewing the stope map (for the first time post-cut) in response to the collapse:
6

Q

When the map was presented to you and you

7 looked at it, what did you see? What stood out to you?

8
A I asked Scott [Hogamier, Safety Foreman], I asked him, "Where is
he at?"
9
He pointed here.
10
And I looked at it. And I had to -- it took me
11 a few seconds to digest what the map said. And I just
12 looked across the table at -- you know, and across the
13 table was [Mine General Manager] John Jordan. I don't know what he -if he
14 was on the phone or what he was doing. But I just
15 looked at him and I said, "You gotta be fucking kidding
16 me."
17
Q What was the reaction?
18
A He looked over at the map, and he saw what I
19 was pointing to, and he just leaned back and went "Oh,
20 God."
21
Q And to what were you referring?
22
A I was referring to the pillar. The map
23 indicates that they were directed to mine the pillar
24 out.
25
Q And you had a reaction to that why?
1
A First of all, I didn't know anything about it.
2 And, you know, I didn't know what they had done to abate
3 the very high potential for failure.
4
And I was quite suspicious -- I mean I just
5 knew -- I mean I could look at the map and I could see
6 where the face was at, what part of the pillar had been
7 mined out. And I could just imagine in my mind that it
8 was a huge pile of rock.
(R. 34 (Krusemark Depo, 11. 18:6-19:S)(emphasis added).

Mr. Krusemark further

indicated that, had it been presented to him, the plan for pillar removal (as was
ultimately performed) would not have been approved, being devoid of any ground
support plan:
24
Q You testified previously that had you been
25 consulted about the mine plan that's shown in Exhibit
1 33, you would not have approved it without a tested,
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

designed, engineered ground support plan; correct?
A That's still my stance, yes.
Q And the ground support plan that was in
existence at the time wasn't engineered specifically for
the circumstances that were found in Cut 3 of the 615[0]-15
stope where it undermined the pillar, was it?
A Yes. I guess if that's -- I agree, and I -there's -- what you've just said, I agree with.
Q You described it as way outside of the norm,
A Yes.
Q And I believe you said in your testimony that
it wasn't that there wasn't compliance with the ground
support plan. It was that there was no ground support
plan for this configuration.
A That's correct.

(R. 535 (Krusemark Depa, 11. 24:24-25:16)(emphasis added); accord R. 676 & 687

(De Voe Depa, 11. 98:7-21 & Depa. Exh. 64).)
Further exacerbating the lack of engineering review was the fact that the
extent of the pillar removal in the 6150-15 stope was greater than had ever been
done before in the mine. (See, e.g., R. 717-718 (Lund Depa, 11. 13:18-14:13); R. 500
(Bayer Depa, 11. 26:24-28:4).)

Despite this, Hecla did not have a full-time rock

mechanics engineer until after the collapse, and no outside consultant was utilized
to evaluate the pillar removal. (R. 511 (Bayer Depo, 11. 72:6-21); R. 451 (Cox Depo,
11. 39:6-40:23); R. 659 (De Voe Depo, at 11. 32:25-33:2); R. 693 (Jordan Depo, 11. 14:1415:5); R. 725 (Lund Depo, at 11. 43:13-18).)
•

Safety review and safety steps were not undertaken. Although Hecla's

Safety Foreman, Scott Hogamier observed the pillar removal and had "never
personally done anything like that, removing any pillars," he was not involved in
the decision to remove the pillars at issue, and did not review the mining plans
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regarding removal of the pillar. (R. 551-554 (Hogamier Depo, 11. 19:25-23:22; 25:2529:12-30:24).) As an additional complication, the west stope was blasted wider

than intended; however, no additional support (such as timbering) was installed or
even considered in conjunction with the pillar removal. (R. 453-454 (Cox Depo, 11.
49:10-50:17); R. 517 (Bayer Depo, 11. 964-12).)

•

Hecla received warning about the removal of the pillars.

Former

employees of Hecla have testified that they specifically raised concerns about
removal of the pillars. Tim Ruff, former production geologist for Hecla, testified
that he attempted to raise the issue on multiple occasions, only to be rebuffed. For
example, he testified that his efforts to raise the issue with Mine Superintendent
Doug Bayer were disregarded:
15 Q. (BY MR. HAVAS) So is that when you had
16 this conversation with Mr. Bayer in his office?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Tell us about that conversation, who was
19 present and what was discussed?
20 A. It was just he and I present, and I might
21 have seen him in the hall, he may have requested
22 that I bring those maps for him to see. But at any
23 rate, whether he asked or not, I gathered up the
24 maps, brought them down to his office and Doug was
25 always -- his door was always open, and I brought
1 'em in and showed them to him, and he contemplated
2 the whole thing again. And finally he said, well,
3 this is what De Voe wants, and just kind of shrugged
4 his shoulders, like, it's out of my hands, you
5 know.
6 Q. Did you understand what he meant by, this
7 is what De Voe wants?
8 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, speculation.
9 A. Yeah.
10 Q. (BY MR. HAVAS) What did you understand
11 it to mean?
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12 A. That they had made up their minds to take
13 this pillar out, come hell or high water. And I
14 still don't quite understand, I would have thought
15 that Doug, being the mine superintendent, would
16 have been able to override -- and him being an
17 engineer, would have been able to override anything
18 Terry said, but Terry's a pretty strong personality
19 and pretty forceful, and he may have just convinced
20 him that this is the best thing to do, and -21 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, speculation.
22 Q. (BY MR. HAVAS) He told you, this is what
23 DeVoe wants?
24A. Right.
(R. 242-243 & 402-407 (Ruff Depo, 11. 151:15-152:24 & Depo. Exh. 3).) Mr. Ruff had
no more success with Chief Production Geologist Bruce Cox or Chief Mine Geologist
Terry DeVoe:
6 Q. Your summary goes on to say, from that
7 point on you tried to convince Bruce and Terry -8 and again that's Bruce Cox and Terry DeVoe?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. -- almost daily to reconsider before it's
11 too late until they began to get angry with you.
12 Tell us about that, to the extent you haven't
13 already. How -- how was the communication between
14 you and Bruce and Terry daily? How did that come
15 up? What happened? Who said what?
16 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, hearsay, compound.
17 Go ahead.
18 A. Well, a lot of times, mostly I talked to
19 Bruce because we were in the same office and I'd
20 come up after -- excuse me -- after coming up from
21 underground and I'd just tell him, Bruce, you know,
22 this ain't a good idea. You should see that thing.
23 And little by little -- you know, first
24 he'd just tell me, well, you know, this is what
25 we're gonna do and it'll be all right, and later he
1 started to get a little short.
2 And actually the first time I had really
3 ever heard Bruce raise his voice was during one of
4 those conversations, he just flat told me that --
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5 you know, just drop it, forget it, you know, this
6 is what we're gonna do, you know.
7 Q. (BY MR. HAVAS) You had conversations
8 with Terry De Voe of a similar nature?
9 A. Yes, a couple.
10 Q. Where did those take place?
11 A. One in the -- one in the hall, and he
12 told me too, you know, when I brought it up again,
13 and he was already getting a little -- a little
14 short, and he said, just drop it, this is what's
15 gonna happen, get over it, you know, and walked
16 into his office.
(R. 244-245 (Ruff Depo, 11. 153:6-154:16).) Mr. Ruff further testified that he also
spoke with a couple of shift bosses and Mine Foreman John Lund, but "their
reaction universally is, well, I'm just doing my job, you know, that this is what the
bosses want and this is my job is to see that they get it." (R. 245-246, 11. 154: 17155:4).) Mr. Ruff was particularly concerned that the removal of the pillar in 615015 would, as a result, leave the pillar in the previously-mined area above hanging

free in space with no support. (R. 209-213 & 402-407 (Ruff Depo, 11. 118:20-122:9 &
Depo. Exh. 3).)
Similarly, Danny McGillis, a former Hecla "Sugar Daddy" miner 7 with 38
years of service with Hecla, testified that he'd never worked anywhere where a
pillar had been removed to that extent, and that he had attempted to address the
issue with Doug Bayer:
20 A Between shifts we always talk to each other,
21 you know, the people that are coming off, that came up
22 from underground, and the people that are replacing them
As explained by Mr. McGillis in his deposition, a "Sugar Daddy" is "somebody that has -- well, they
put a job up for bid, and the person that gets that bid is the one that has the most seniority and is
qualified to do the job. So in turn, he gets a bid, gets a job, and he picks the people that he wants to
work with." (R. 571 (McGillis Depo, 11. 9: 15-20).)
7
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23 and going back under.
24
And this one particular day, Eric Tester come
25 up to me, and he says, "Boy, Dan, we -- I was bolting,
1 and the whole back started to dribble."
2
And what that indicates, when it starts
3 dribbling all over, small pieces falling off the back,
4 it indicates that the ground is weakening and there's a
5 good possibility of a cave-in.
6
He said it dribbled for a while and then it
7 quit.
8
So at that time, it -- I had been concerned
9 before, but at that time I really got concerned. I went
10 to Doug Bayer, and told him, I says, "Doug, boy, we got
11 to do something different." I explained the story to
12 him that Eric had told me about the dribbling.
13
"And we just -- we really got to do something
14 different.
15
His reply to me was that "I will look into it,
16 and possibly maybe next cut we'll do something
17 different."
18
At that time, I went on to kind of explain
19 maybe a couple things we could possibly do now to maybe
20 put stulls[SJ in underneath the pillar. And he said,
21 "We'll look into it." And that was -- it was a very
22 short conversation.
23
But that was about it. And then I went on my
24 way to go to work.
11

(R. 575 (McGillis Depo, 11. 23:20-24:24.)

•

Hecla placed the Mareks directly into danger, as they performed

work within the normal scope of their duties. Hecla contended it did not send
the Mareks into a dangerous place, because the Mareks were given tasks in the
spray chambers in the slot since the stopes were muck-bound. It was alleged, and
facts establish, that the Mareks were ordered to work in a dangerous environment.

(See generally, R. 15-23

Cirif 30-39,

4 7-55, 57-70, 78, & 84).) In summary judgment

briefing, the Mareks highlighted the testimony of multiple employees/miners
8

"Stulls" are platforms or columns, usually of timber, set for additional support to the mine roof.
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regarding the issue, including that of Mike Marek, Doug Bayer, Dale Stepro, George
Houchin, and Dan McGillis, regarding the scope of work performed by Mike and
Pete Marek on the date of the rockfall. This testimony, in summary, established
that the Mareks' work area was the entire 6150-15 stope

not just the slot - and

that the tasks being performed, including watering down the muck piles in the
stopes, were standard work duties.

(See generally R. 835-841; R. 618 (Houchin

Depo, 11. 23:8-18); R. 593-594 (McGillis Depo, 11. 97:25-98:9); R. 636 & 647-649
(Stepro Depo, 11. 35:4-37:12 & Depo. Exh. 15); R. 123-124 (Ruff Depo, 11. 32:25-33:3);

R. 884-885 (MSHA proceeding testimony, Mike Marek, 11. 309:21-310:18); R. 512513 (Bayer Depo, 11. 77:13-79:12)(A: I don't believe either miner did anything wrong
as to being in the -- in the stope or whatnot.")); R. 636 (Stepro Depo, 11. 34:1-25 &
36:19-37:12); R. 618 (Houchin Depo, 11. 23:8-18); R. 594 & 608 (McGillis Depo, 11.
98:5-9 &155:2-156:11).) It was anticipated and foreseen
a matter of normal mining practice

and, indeed, expected as

that they would work in the stope.

As

experienced, capable miners and within their work assignment, the Mareks could
and did exercise their judgment as to the work to be done in the stope, including
preparing the stope for mucking, reduction of dust, cooling, etc. by spraying down
the muck.

The testimony revealed that this was a normal part of the Mareks'

mining work, in their assigned area, for which there was no criticism, and the
question should not focus too narrowly on the spray chamber versus the stope as the
area of work at the precise moment this tragedy occurred. Defendants created the
unreasonable risk of death and injury in undercutting the pillar in that stope, then
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sent its crews to work in the stope. Crews worked in the stope under the undercut
pillar before the fateful day, and would have again following it had the massive rock
fall not occurred right then.

The Mareks were sent to the 6150-15 stope and

subjected to the avoidable hazard of the undercut pillar, irrespective of whether in
conjunction ,,,ith that assignment they ~l1crc to \vork in the spray chamber, on

maintenance tasks, or the stope itself. At a minimum, the scope of the work the
Marks were assigned on April 15, 2011, was a genuine issue of material fact,
precluding summary judgment for Hecla.

•

Hecla was significantly sanctioned by MSHA.

On April 28, 2015,

following the District Court's summary judgment decision, the Decision and Order
in the MSHA Civil Penalty Proceeding against Hecla was entered ("MSHA Order").
(R. Adden. 8-26.) Importantly, the MSHA Order outlined the severity of Heda's
actions/inaction, including:
o "Hecla did not present any data, evidence, or test results to
demonstrate that the horizontal pressures were sufficient to support
the ground under these conditions. Hecla violated [30 C.F.R.] section
57.3360 because it did not design or install a support system adequate
to control the ground in the cited area." (R. Adden. 17-18.)
o "I find that the Secretary established that the violation was S&S
[Significant and Substantial]. A lengthy analysis is not required for
this finding. A violation occurred that contributed to a discrete safety
hazard, a measure of danger to safety. The Secretary established that
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there was a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to by the
violation would result in an event in which there is an injury. The
discrete hazard was a fall of ground and such a fall was reasonably
likely because the pillar was inadequately supported."

(R. Adden.

18)(emphasis added).
o "I find that the violation was the result of Heda's reckless disregard
and unwarrantable failure to comply with the safety standard. . ..
Although I do not believe that Hecla intentionally risked the lives of
miners, I find that Hecla should have known that the roof support in
15 west beneath the waste pillar would endanger miners and violate
section 57.3360. ... It should have been obvious that a large,
unsupported rock mass could endangered [sic] miners, yet Hecla did
not ascertain whether the waste pillar in 15 stope was adequately
supported." (R. Adden. 19.)
o "The failure to analyze the risks posed by removmg a pillar for a
distance of 75 feet demonstrates aggravated conduct because it shows
that Hecla made no effort to properly design its ground support in this
situation." (Id.)
o "I reached this conclusion [increasing penalties for two orders from
$20,900 to $50,000 each] because of the serious safety hazard created
by these violations and Hecla's high negligence. Management knew
that (1) fractures and faults were often present in the host rock; (2)
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mmers were gomg to undercut the pillars for a [sic] considerable
distances; (3) undercutting pillars for significant distances was not a
typical practice in the Gold Hunter section of the mine, and (4) no
engineering study or any other study had been undertaken to
determine whether its ground support plan would adequately support
the roof under such conditions." (R. Adden. 24 (emphasis added).)
o "I find that the Secretary establish [sic] that the civil penalty for
Citation No. 8559607 should be assessed under the Mine Act's flagrant
violation provision .... In the present case, Hecla management had
knowledge of the cited conditions .... Heda's management knew that
miners were going to undercut the pillar for a distance of about 75 feet
during cut 3, knew that it was unusual for miners to undercut a pillar
for such a significant distance in the Gold Hunter section of the mine,
and knew that no engineering study or any other study that had been
undertaken to

determine

whether its existing ground support

standards would adequately support the roof or the pillar under such
conditions. Hecla also knew that the rock structure in the host rock
was subject to faults and fractures in the rock .... I also conclude that
the violation substantially and proximately caused the death of Larry
Marek." (R. Adden. 26)(emphasis added)(assessing a civil penalty of
$180,000.00).)
These findings, entered after a fully and fairly litigated dispute in which Hecla,
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through counsel, presented contrary testimony and argument in an adversarial
proceeding, more than support that, like Elias, Hecla "acted with a harmful state of
mind and that in doing so, [ ] either understood, or knowingly disregarded, the
likely consequences of' having miners work in an area rendered unsafe by Heda's
own actions and failures to address the appalling lack of safety. (In re Elias, 302
B.R. at 912.) This squarely places it within the exception to workers' compensation
exclusivity.
In the face of overwhelming evidence that Hecla had knowledge of a potential
back failure in the 6150-15 stope, but nonetheless sent the Mareks into that area to
work, with certain knowledge that injury would result from back failure and the
catastrophic fall of rock it would entail, Hecla cannot carry its burden in supporting
this affirmative defense. The Mareks are entitled to summary judgment thereon
and the District Court erred in finding otherwise.
2. The District Court erred in holding that the Mareks - rather than Hecla bore the burden regarding workers' compensation exclusivity on summary
judgment.
The question of workers' compensation exclusivity in this action arose as an
affirmative defense asserted by Hecla:
SIXTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff Mike Marek and the plaintiffs' decedent Larry "Pete"
Marek were employees of defendant Hecla Limited at the time of and
in connection with the matters alleged in the complaint. Pursuant to
Idaho Code §72-209, and other law or statute, plaintiffs' exclusive
remedy is limited to the remedies set forth in Idaho's Worker's
Compensation Law, Idaho Code §72-1-1, et seq.
(R. 51.)
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In the context of affirmative defenses, "a nonmoving defendant has the
burden of supporting a claimed affirmative defense on a motion for summary
judgment."

Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 771, 215 P.3d 485, 491

(2009)(emphasis added); accord Fuhriman v. State, Dep't of Transp., 143 Idaho 800,
803, 1113 P .3d 480, 483 (2007)("An affirmative defense is '[a] defendant's assertion

raising new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiffs or
prosecution's claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true'. Immunity from
third party suit as a statutory employer fits within this definition of affirmative
defense. Even if all the allegations in Appellants' complaint are true-that the State
is liable in tort for the death and injury of several construction workers-the State
raises the argument and supporting facts that it is protected by I.C. § 72-223
because it is a statutory employer, and that would defeat Appellants' claim.
Therefore, we hold immunity through qualification as a statutory employer is an
affirmative defense.")(internal citation omitted).
The District Court's holding, that the Kearney decision instead placed the
burden on the Mareks, ignores that the subsequent Idaho Supreme Court decision
in Roe v. Albertson's Inc., 141 Idaho 524, 112 P.3d 812 (2005), decided almost two
decades after Kearney, instructs otherwise. In Roe, in a suit against Albertson's
regarding the statutory rape of an underage employee by an assistant manager,
"Albertson's denied responsibility, asserting several defenses including that the
Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law precluded recovery." Roe, 141 Idaho at 527.
In moving for summary judgment, this Court made clear that it was defendant
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Albertson's burden to show that the claimed injury fell within the scope of workers'
comp exclusivity:
Albertson's, as the moving party, must show there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact that Doe would have been covered by worker's
compensation and that it is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Eligibility under worker's compensation requires a showing
that the injury vms caused by an accident arising out of and in the
course of employment. Therefore, Albertsons must demonstrate Doe
suffered an injury covered by workers compensation.
Roe, 141 Idaho at 530 (emphasis added)(internal citation omitted).

The Idaho

Supreme Court's holding in Roe makes clear, then, that the burden should have
fallen on Hecla to prove exclusivity as an affirmative defense

even as the

nonmoving party and a fortiori where, as here, it was also the moving defendant as
to its own summary judgment motion predicated on the same affirmative defense.
Accordingly, the District Court's Summary Judgment Decision, predicated in
part on improper assignment of burden, should be reversed.
B.

The District Court erred in holding that there were no disputed issues of material
fact in granting summary judgment in favor of Hecla.

In ruling upon the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the District
Court erred in narrowly construing the workers' compensation exclusivity
exception, as discussed above. Specifically, the District Court held that "Plaintiffs
have failed to put forth any evidence that Defendants harbored any ill will toward
Mike and/or Pete, nor have Plaintiffs put forth any evidence the Defendants wanted
to cause injury or death to Plaintiffs," and, as such, "the Court finds that there are
no genuine issues of material fact on the issue of whether Idaho \Vorker's
Compensation provides Plaintiffs their exclusive remedy." (R. 973.)
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As discussed above, while this narrow evaluation of facts flows frorn an
incorrectly narrow reading of the Kearney and J)eMoss decisions (and demands
facts that are not present m the later Dominguez cases), the District Court does, in
fact, acknowledge the presence of disputed facts in this matter which it did not take
into consideration in making its ruling: "The Court finds that while there may be
some disputed facts in the case at bar, such as whether Defendants received
warnings that the mining practices were dangerous and whether it was necessary
for the chief engineer to approve the mining plan, those disputed facts are not
material[.]" (R. 973)(emphasis in original).
While the Mareks certainly contend the facts regarding Heda's knowledge
and conduct are sufficiently established so as to warrant summary judgment in
favor of the Mareks, at a minimum, such "disputed" facts should have precluded
summary judgment being granted in favor of Hecla. As such, reversal and remand
are appropriate.
C.

The District Court erred in holding that Respondents Baker, Jordan, Bayer,
Hogamier, Moore, and Stepro were fellow servants immune from suit under I.C.
§72-209.

In further granting Heda's motion for summary judgment, and denying the
Mareks', the District Court erred in holding that the individually-named defendants
"were fellow servants of Pete and Mike, and are therefore immune from liability
under I.C. §72-209." (R. 97 4.)
In making that ruling, the District Court briefly held that the "according to
the plain language of I.C. §72-209, the exception from liability ... also extends to

APPELLANTS' BRIEF -42

officer[s], agents, servants, or employees of the employer." (Jd.)9 For the reasons
discussed above, summary judgment in favor of Hecla (and denial of summary
judgment in the Mareks' favor) is not supported by the facts and case law in this
matter as were presented and argued on summary judgment. Accordingly, for that
reason, and as the District Court provided no other factual or legal basis for such
ruling, the decision of the District Court on this point should also be reversed and
remanded.

D.

The District Court erred in denying the Marcks' Motion for Reconsideration of the
District Court's summary judgment decision.

Following the District Court's summary judgment decision, the Mareks
moved for reconsideration, highlighting three areas: 1) a mistake of law as to which
party bore the burden on summary judgment; 2) the Mareks' scope of work on the
date of the rockfall; and 3) the MSHA Decision, issued after the summary judgment
determination by the Court.

(R. Adden. 29-35.)

Following briefing, the District

Court denied the motion for reconsideration from the bench. (Transcript, August

18, 2015 ("2nd Tr."), 11. 24:21-28:6.)
As to the Mareks' first point, the District Court confirmed its prior holding

9

This is apparently in reference to §72-209(3), which provides:
(3) The exemption from liability given an employer by this section shall also extend
to the employer's surety and to all officers, agents, servants and employees of the
employer or surety, provided that such exemptions from liability shall not apply in
any case where the injury or death is proximately caused by the wilful or unprovoked
physical aggression of the employer, its officers, agents, servants or employees, the
loss of such exemption applying only to the aggressor and shall not be imputable to
the employer unless provoked or authorized by the employer, or the employer was a
party thereto.

(Emphasis added.)
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that the Mareks bore the burden on summary judgment. (Id., 11. 27:10-14.).

As

discussed above, however, this ruling is legally erroneous and should be reversed.
As to the scope of work, the District Court generally agreed that the Mareks
were within the scope of their work in being in the area of the stope at issue, but
held that it did not matter under the District Court's reading of Kearney:
With respect to the argument by the plaintiffs that the general duty
assignment to that stope was sufficient to constitute an authorization
that they be in there watering the muck, I think that's true, but that's
not the test. As Mr. Ramsden points out, was there express direction
to go in there which amounted to willful or unprovoked physical
aggression?

(Id., 11. 26:13-19.) What such evidence does demonstrate is precisely the scenario
discussed in Justice Huntley's concurrence in Kearney, and later occurring in
Dominguez.

Kearney, 114 Idaho at 758 ("[T]here can be instances where an

employer's knowing ordering of an employee into an unsafe working environment
would, in my judgment, rise to the level of wilful physical aggression."). As such,
the District Court's refusal to grant reconsideration on this point was in error.
Further, the Court held that the MSHA Decision "did not get to a willful act,
did not get to any physical aggression." (Id., 11. 25:14-15.) Again, while incorrectly
applying a narrow reading of Kearney, this holding also erroneously fails to
recognize that the MSHA Decision - imposing, after a fully litigated contested
proceeding significant penalties on Hecla and noting "Heda's reckless disregard and
unwarrantable failure to comply with the safety standard" (R. Adden. 19) - outlines
the kind of conduct warned of by Justice Huntley and otherwise punished in
Dominguez. The District Court thereby erred in failing to consider this information
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and its support for Plaintiffs' allegations, and this Court should reverse. Fragnella,
153 Idaho at 276 ("[W]hen reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for
reconsideration following the grant of summary judgment, this Court must
determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat
summary judgment.").
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the District Court's denial of the
Mareks' Motion for Reconsideration, and remand the matter.

VI.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the April 21, 2015 decision of the District Court
granting summary judgment to Hecla, and, in turn, denying the Mareks' motion for
summary judgment, as well as the District Court's September 3, 2015, denial of the
Mareks' motion for reconsideration, should be reversed and remanded to the
District Court.
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